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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










GEORGE ROCKY BALBOA,  
 
        Appellant 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 4-94-cr-00310-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann 
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on March 3, 2015 
 
Before: AMBRO, SCIRICA and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 







ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 The District Court sentenced George Rocky Balboa to a twenty-four month term 
of imprisonment after finding he violated various conditions of his supervised release.  
We will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
I. Background 
 On June 28, 1995, Balboa pled guilty to money laundering1 and conspiracy to 
defraud financial institutions and commit money laundering.2  He was sentenced to 150 
months’ imprisonment, followed by three years’ supervised release.  On April 17, 2014, 
mere months after his release from prison, Balboa was arrested in Chicago for violating 
the conditions of his release. 
 At a revocation hearing on July 21, 2014, Balboa admitted to the following 
violations of his supervised release conditions:  unauthorized travel outside the judicial 
district of his supervised release, failure to report as directed to his probation officer, and 
lying to his probation officer.  Balboa did not admit that he had violated conditions 
requiring him to notify his probation officer of an address change and prohibiting him 
from committing additional crimes.   
 The District Court reviewed the following evidence that Balboa committed 
additional crimes while on supervised release:  (1) an unsigned police report certified by 
a Mansfield Township, New Jersey, police officer and an arrest warrant authorized by a 
Mansfield Township Municipal Court judge charging Balboa with theft by deception, bad 
checks, and harassment by communications concerning a $5,900 check deposited on 
                                              
1 See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(1). 
2 See 18 U.S.C. § 371. 
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February 7, 2014; (2) a signed criminal complaint, attested to under oath by a Scranton, 
Pennsylvania, police officer, and an arrest warrant issued by a Pennsylvania magisterial 
district judge, charging Balboa with theft, unauthorized use of a vehicle, bad checks, and 
theft by deception resulting from conduct that took place on March 21 and 22, 2014; and 
(3) an arrest warrant signed by a Lake County, Illinois, Circuit Court judge on May 29, 
2014, charging Balboa with deceptive practices for passing bad checks. 
 The District Court considered corroborating evidence as well, including a 
Pennsylvania State Police crash report detailing a March 4, 2014, accident involving a 
rental car driven by Balboa, and an Ohio Department of Public Safety crash report 
detailing a March 23, 2014, accident involving a rental car driven by Balboa.  In addition, 
the District Court considered Balboa’s probation officer’s testimony that she learned 
about his new, post-release criminal violations directly from local law enforcement 
agencies.  The probation officer further testified that she was unable to make contact with 
Balboa by phone or at the address he identified as his residence from March 27 to April 
2, 2014, and that Balboa failed to report to her office for a mandatory appointment on 
April 3, 2014.  Balboa did not object to the admission of any evidence against him.3 
                                              
3 When asked if she had any objection to the admission of the documentary evidence 
relating to Balboa’s commission of additional, post-release crimes, his counsel 
responded:  “No, Your Honor.  But this will give me an opportunity just for the record to 
state that obviously I cannot confront and cross examine a piece of paper.  That’s why I 
don’t believe the Government has proven its case by a preponderance of the evidence.”   
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 The District Court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Balboa had 
violated all five conditions charged in the superseding petition.  Accordingly, the court 
revoked supervised release and sentenced Balboa to twenty-four months’ imprisonment.4 
II. Analysis5 
 We review the District Court’s decision for plain error because defense counsel 
did not object to the introduction of hearsay evidence of Balboa’s criminal conduct.6  
“For reversible plain error to exist, there must be (1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that 
affects substantial rights; and (4) which seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.”7 
 The District Court did not commit error, plain or otherwise, in admitting hearsay 
evidence that Balboa committed additional crimes while on supervised release.  In the 
revocation context, courts may admit hearsay evidence subject to a balancing of the 
                                              
4 Twenty-four months’ imprisonment represents the statutory maximum sentence for any 
supervised release violation(s) stemming from an underlying Class C or D felony 
conviction.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). 
5 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3583(e).  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
6 Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); see United States v. Paladino, 769 F.3d 197, 200 (3d Cir. 2014); 
supra note 5.  Defense counsel’s allusion to her inability to “cross examine a piece of 
paper” was insufficient to preserve a hearsay objection on appeal.  See In re Ins. 
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 262 (3d Cir. 2009).  A party must 
“unequivocally put its position before the trial court at a point and in a manner that 
permits the court to consider its merits.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  Here, defense counsel merely echoed the District Court’s acknowledgment that 
despite the relaxed evidentiary standards applicable to revocation hearings, a defendant is 
owed certain due process protections.  Balboa concedes he advanced no “particularized 
objection . . . to the admission of the hearsay.” 
7 Paladino, 769 F.3d at 201 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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defendant’s “interest in the constitutionally guaranteed right to confrontation against the 
government’s good cause for denying it.”8   
 Here, the District Court acknowledged as much, noting at the revocation hearing 
that “despite the[] relaxed standards” of evidence applicable to revocation proceedings, 
“[d]efendants are entitled to minimal due process requirements, including the right to 
confront and cross examine adverse witnesses.”  The court then “assume[d] without 
deciding that [] district judges’ consideration of unsworn probation officer statements 
might potentially violate a right and constitute an obvious error,” but that here such an 
error “would be harmless as it did not affect any substantial rights.” 
 Balboa argues the District Court erred in not requiring the government to articulate 
“good cause” for the court’s reliance on hearsay evidence.  We rejected such an inflexible 
standard when faced with a “releasee’s asserted right to cross-examine adverse 
witnesses.”9  Moreover, the evidence at issue—including a signed criminal complaint and 
arrest warrant relating to additional crimes Balboa allegedly committed in Pennsylvania 
and a signed arrest warrant charging him with additional crimes in Illinois—bear 
                                              
8 United States v. Lloyd, 566 F.3d 341, 344-45 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 
32.1(b)(2)(C) advisory committee note concerning 2002 amendments); see generally 
Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
9 Lloyd, 566 F.3d at 344-45 (emphasis added) (“[W]e reject a per se rule that a district 
court’s failure to explicitly address cause amounts to reversible error in all cases.”). 
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sufficient indicia of reliability to overcome a hypothetical hearsay objection.10  Thus, the 
District Court did not commit reversible plain error.  
 Moreover, this evidence, whether hearsay or not, did not “seriously affect[] the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”11  Coupled with Balboa’s 
probation officer’s live testimony (most of which was non-hearsay), the various police 
reports, arrest warrants, criminal complaints, and crash reports introduced by the 
government paint a vivid, and consistent, picture of Balboa’s disregard for the conditions 
of his supervised release, including the prohibition against committing additional crimes. 
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
                                              
10 The District Court appears to have reached the same conclusion.  In discussing the 
applicable legal standard, the Court contrasted “unsworn probation officer statements” 
with the trove of manifestly reliable evidence from multiple jurisdictions on which it 
premised its finding that Balboa engaged in criminal activity while on supervised release. 
11 See United States v. Dragon, 471 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States 
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)).  
